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The Right to Pre-trial Silence:
Where Does It Stand and
What’s Next after Singh?
Jamie Klukach and Diana Lumba*

I. INTRODUCTION
In R. v. Singh,1 released November 1, 2007, the Supreme Court of
Canada filled in the gaps that were left by its earlier jurisprudence on the
section 7 right to silence during custodial police interrogation. The scope
of the right to silence in this context lingered as a live issue after the
Court’s landmark decision in R. v. Hebert2 in 1990; and R. v. Oickle,3
rendered a decade later in 2000, deepened the need for clarification
about the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’4 role in protecting
a detainee’s pre-trial right to silence during police questioning. The
intervenors climbed aboard in Singh, an indication of the importance of
the issue that stood to be resolved.5
This paper will look at how the Court’s resolution of this issue came,
perhaps, as somewhat unexpected against the backdrop of Hebert and
Oickle. It will also consider what directions the law might now move in,
toward further refinement of the principles set down in Singh.

*
Jamie Klukach is counsel at the Crown Law Office, Criminal Division in Toronto. Diana
Lumba completed her articles at that office. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and are in no manner representative of the office of the Ministry of the Attorney General of
Ontario.
1
[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”].
2
[1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hebert”].
3
[2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oickle”].
4
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
5
Interventions were granted to the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, the Attorney
General of Ontario, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the Criminal Lawyers’
Association of Ontario.
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II. THE ROAD TO SINGH
Singh casts the section 7 right to silence during detained police
questioning as being the functional equivalent of the common law
confessions rule.6 It lays to rest the controversy concerning the interplay
between the confessions rule and the Charter right to silence that
followed Hebert and Oickle. Writing for the Court’s majority in Singh,
Charron J. firmly declared that, in this context, section 7 has no life
independent of the confessions rule:
… [T]he confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional right
to silence in circumstances where an obvious person in authority is
interrogating a person who is in detention because, in such
circumstances, the two tests are functionally equivalent. 7

In Hebert,8 the Court recognized a pre-trial right to silence under
section 7 of the Charter at the investigative stage of a criminal
prosecution. Hebert dealt with incriminating statements elicited from an
accused in a jail cell by an undercover police officer. The confessions
rule offered no protection in these circumstances: the statements would
have been admissible because the accused did not appreciate that he was
making them to a person in authority. The Court held that the Charter
provided protection against unfairness where the confessions rule would
not. In defining the pre-trial right to silence, the Court drew on the
confessions rule and the privilege against self-incrimination and their
unifying theme of “choice”. In the circumstances of Hebert, the conduct
of the police prevented the detainee from being able to make a
meaningful choice about whether to speak to them.
Although the question of permissible limits to police questioning of
a detainee who knows that she is talking to the police did not factually
arise in Hebert, the Court provided some guidance on the scope of the
right to silence in this context, again tying it into the concept of
“choice”:
… there is nothing in the rule to prohibit police from questioning the
accused in the absence of counsel after the accused has retained
counsel. Presumably, counsel will inform the accused of the right to
remain silent. If the police are not posing as undercover officers and
the accused chooses to volunteer information, there will be no violation
6
7
8

Singh, supra, note 1, at paras. 25 and 39.
Id., at para. 39.
Supra, note 2.
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of the Charter. Police persuasion, short of denying the suspect the right
to choose or depriving him of an operating mind, does not breach the
right to silence.9

And:
The state is not obliged to protect the suspect against making a
statement; indeed, it is open to the state to use legitimate means of
persuasion to encourage the suspect to do so.10

This interplay between the common law rule and the Charter was
explored further in Oickle11 when the Court considered the common law
limits on police interrogation under the confessions rule. Justice
Iacobucci commented that the case provided an important opportunity
“to set out the proper scope of the confessions rule”, noting that the issue
had not been directly addressed by the Court since the introduction of
the Charter.12
The thematic thrust of Oickle was that common law voluntariness is
concerned chiefly with the reliability of statements obtained through
police interrogation to safeguard against the danger of false confessions
and resulting miscarriages of justice. At the outset of discussing the
“precise scope” of the confessions rule “today”, Iacobucci J. stated:
… the confessions rule is concerned with voluntariness, broadly
defined. One of the predominant reasons for this concern is that
involuntary confessions are more likely to be unreliable. The
confessions rule should recognize which interrogation techniques
commonly produce false confessions so as to avoid miscarriages of
justice.13

This philosophical approach was evident throughout the judgment.
The focus on reliability as the cornerstone of voluntariness shifted but
briefly when the Court discussed the “community shock” test that was
articulated by Lamer J. in R. v. Rothman.14 It was only in relation to
police trickery that would shock the conscience of the community that
the Court allowed for accommodation, within the confessions rule, of an
objective that is distinct from reliability; that is based on concern for
9
10
11
12
13
14

Id., at para. 73.
Id., at para. 53.
Supra, note 3.
Id., at para. 23.
Id., at para. 32.
[1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
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“maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system” and for
“protection of the accused’s rights and fairness in the criminal process”.15
Apart from the kind of egregious and appalling conduct that would
meet the “community shock” standard, the Court expressed no concern
for the treatment of accused by the police beyond its potential to impugn
the statement’s reliability. The modern day confessions rule that emerged
in Oickle relegates fairness to an afterthought, once the reliability of the
statement is assured. If the conduct of the police could have induced a
false confession, then it was, no doubt, unfair to boot. Perhaps not
surprisingly, Oickle was the subject of much academic criticism for its
near-exclusive focus on reliability and seeming disregard for procedural
fairness in delineating the limits on police conduct under the common
law rule.16
Just eight months before its judgment in Singh, the Court reaffirmed
Oickle’s reliability-preoccupied formulation of the confessions rule in
the case of R. v. Spencer.17 The Court’s determined focus on reliability as
the barometer of police impropriety under the confessions rule fit
sensibly with its earlier decision in Hebert. When the Court turned, in
Oickle, to set out the proper scope of the confessions rule, it had already
recognized, in Hebert, the additional scope for protection against unfair
police practices afforded by section 7. Indeed, Iacobucci J. specifically
stated that “the focus [of Hebert] was on defining constitutional rights”18
and that:
… it would be a mistake to confuse it [the common law confessions
rule] with the protections given by the Charter. While obviously it may
be appropriate, as in Hebert, … to interpret one in light of the other, it
would be a mistake to assume one subsumes the other entirely. 19

With the Charter in its back pocket to take care of fairness concerns
that did not touch on reliability, the Court adopted a relatively
conservative approach to the confessions rule. There was simply no need
to radically update it. If the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statement was voluntary, then it would still be open to the
15

Oickle, supra, note 3, at paras. 65-67, 69.
See, e.g., Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s Recipe for Coercive Interrogation”
(2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188; Edmund Thomas, “Lowering the Standard: R. v. Oickle and the
Confessions Rule in Canada” (2005) 10 Can. Crim. Law Rev. 69.
17
[2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer”].
18
Oickle, supra, note 3, at para. 29.
19
Id., at para. 31.
16

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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accused to establish, on the lower standard of proof, that the conduct of
the police nonetheless offended against her section 7 right to silence.
The Charter could provide residual protection against unfairness that was
not caught by the confessions rule. One might say that Hebert offered a
level of comfort to the Court which enabled its decision in Oickle.
But in Singh, the Court turned sharply from what its earlier
judgments appeared to forecast. The modern confessions rule, as it
emerged from Oickle, was grafted onto the Charter right to silence in this
context. Justice Charron acknowledged that section 7 might afford
additional protection beyond the common law in different contexts (as it
had in Hebert), but not in this one.20
No doubt, Singh came as a surprise to defence counsel who, after
Oickle, were crafting their arguments for exclusion, based on unfair
police conduct, around section 7. Indeed, in Singh itself, the voluntariness
of the statements was conceded, both at trial and on appeal.21 It was
Singh’s position that although his statements to the police were voluntary
in the common law sense, the conduct of the police — who persisted in
questioning him in the face of 18 assertions that he wished to remain
silent — so influenced or interfered with his exercise of choice, that his
right to remain silent was trammelled upon. In the end, of course, his
concession as to voluntariness went a long way toward deciding the
section 7 argument.

III. A BALANCING OF INTERESTS
The principle against self-incrimination, which grounds the section 7
right to silence, has been described by the Court as perhaps the single
most important organizing principle in criminal law.22 The right to
silence at trial is specifically protected by section 11(c) of the Charter.
With few exceptions, the Crown cannot make evidentiary use of an
accused’s silence upon arrest or at trial.23

20

Singh, supra, note 1, at para. 40.
Id., at para. 22.
22
R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jones, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 42, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.); R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 10, [1995] 1 S.C.R.
451 (S.C.C.).
23
R. v. Chambers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 108, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1293 (S.C.C.); R. v. Noble,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 40, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (S.C.C.); R. v. Turcotte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.).
21
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As observed by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Hebert, the right
to silence is equally important at the investigatorial phase:
The protection conferred by a legal system which grants the accused
immunity from incriminating himself at trial but offers no protection
with respect to pre-trial statements would be illusory.24

At this stage, the accused is particularly vulnerable to self-incrimination.
He or she is within the custody and control of the state without the same
luxury of protracted consultation with counsel and reasoned reflection
that would bear on a decision to waive the right to silence at trial by
testifying. One might expect, then, special sensitivity to the crucial
importance of the right to silence at this juncture — and to the impact of
police conduct on the detainee’s exercise of choice.
Yet, Singh shows a high degree of tolerance for police persuasion or
influence upon the detainee’s decision to speak. Justice Charron
reasoned that this tolerance strikes a necessary balance between the
accused’s interests and the competing interests of the state in the
effective investigation and prosecution of crime. She noted that police
interrogation plays a particularly important role in the investigation of
crime, stating:
One can readily appreciate that the police could hardly investigate
crime without putting questions to persons from whom it is thought
that useful information may be obtained. The person suspected of
having committed the crime being investigated is no exception. Indeed,
if the suspect in fact committed the crime, he or she is likely the person
who has the most information to offer about the incident. Therefore,
the common law also recognizes the importance of police interrogation
in the investigation of crime.25

In Singh, the Court placed an extraordinary premium on state
investigative interests in the context of post-arrest interrogation. This is
well illustrated by the starkly different outcome to a similar balancing
exercise in R. v. Couture,26 which was decided by the Court some five
months prior to Singh. At stake in Couture was the accused’s interest in
protecting the harmony of his marriage and, in the balance, it beat out
competing societal interests in effective law enforcement.

24
25
26

Hebert, supra, note 2, at para. 45.
Singh, supra, note 1, at para. 28.
[2007] S.C.J. No. 28, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 517 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Couture”].
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At issue in Couture was the admissibility of statements provided by
Couture’s wife to the police. Couture confessed to her that he had killed
two young women. After their marriage, the wife approached the police
and told them about his confessions. She was non-compellable by the
Crown because of the operation of the common law rule of spousal
incompetency so the Crown argued that her hearsay statements were
admissible on principled analysis.
Even though the common law rule, which is testimonial in nature,
has no application to the out-of-court statements of a spouse, Charron J.,
for the majority, reasoned that its underlying rationales would be
undermined by the admission of spousal hearsay statements made during
the course of the marriage. The policy rationales which underpin the
rule of spousal incompetency relate to the promotion of marital harmony
and the repugnance of compelling one spouse to testify against the other
in court. The rule has been criticized for being archaic, historically
rooted in outmoded views of women and marriage, and as a senseless
obstacle to truth-seeking that unjustifiably suppresses relevant evidence.
In R. v. Salituro,27 the Court described it as antithetical to Charter-based
equality values and signalled to Parliament that it was time to consider
its abolition. But in Couture, the Court breathed new life into it,
extending its policy-based rationale well beyond testimonial incapacity
at the cost of excluding highly cogent incriminating evidence.
This concern for the accused’s interest in protecting his marriage at
such sizeable expense to the truth-seeking process seems diametrically at
odds with the Court’s approach in Singh. One might expect that an
accused’s interest in being protected against the risk of selfincrimination by having his or her own statements used against him or
her is at least as pressing as an accused’s interest in being protected
against any potential disruption to his or her marriage, brought about by
permitting the statements of the spouse to incriminate the accused.
Surely the interest against self-incrimination, founded, as it is, on a
central organizing principle of criminal law, out-classes an interest that
rests on a shaky, outdated policy foundation. Both Singh and Couture
were charged with murder, so society’s interest in having all reliable
evidence come forth that could lead to a conviction was present in equal
force in both cases. Ironically, if the police had pressured Mr. Couture to
confess by relentlessly bombarding him with questions despite his
protestations, his confession would have been admitted; yet, his
27

[1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.).
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confession to his spouse — who volunteered it to the police without
prompting — was excluded.

IV. WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR THE PRE-TRIAL RIGHT TO SILENCE?
1. Interplay with Section 24(2)
The hard line taken by the Court on the section 7 right to pre-trial
silence in Singh may have been influenced by the strictures of R. v.
Stillman,28 which effectively created an automatic rule of exclusion for
conscriptive evidence obtained pursuant to a Charter breach. Stillman
left virtually no flexibility to admit conscriptive, non-discoverable
evidence under section 24(2), holding that its admission will ordinarily
result in unfairness, thereby warranting exclusion under the “trial
fairness” branch of the section 24(2) analysis without regard for the
other “Collins” factors.29
In Hebert, which predated Stillman, the Court envisioned a more
flexible application of section 24(2). Justice McLachlin (as she then
was), specifically adverted to the possible admission of evidence
obtained through a breach of the Charter-protected right to silence. She
wrote:
Drawing the balance where I have suggested the Charter draws it
permits the courts to correct abuses of power against the individual,
while allowing them to nevertheless admit evidence under s. 24(2)
where, despite a Charter violation, the admission would not bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.30

And:
I should not be taken as suggesting that violation of an accused’s right
to silence under s. 7 automatically means that the evidence must be
excluded under s. 24(2). I would not wish to rule out the possibility
that there may be circumstances in which a statement might be
received where the suspect has not been accorded a full choice in the
sense of having decided, after full observance of all rights, to make a
statement voluntarily.31

28
29
30
31

[1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stillman”].
Id., at paras. 102, 119.
Hebert, supra, note 2, at para. 71.
Id., at para. 88; see also para. 79.
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Stillman could have had a chilling effect on the Court’s willingness
to more broadly construe the section 7 right in this context since
statement evidence obtained in breach of section 7 will always be
conscriptive in nature and subject to its rule of automatic exclusion.
Broader recognition of the right would mean that highly probative and
reliable evidence would routinely be lost without consideration of how
relatively serious the police conduct giving rise to the breach was, or
whether its exclusion would have a deleterious impact on the repute of
the administration of justice.
Sensitivity to the implications of a rigid section 24(2) analysis
factored into Charron J.’s reasons in Singh. The appellant argued that
section 7 imposed an obligation on police to refrain altogether from
trying to question a detainee once that detainee asserted the wish to
remain silent. In rejecting that position, Charron J. observed that the
protection afforded by the confessions rule was directed at “the potential
abuse by the state of its superior powers over a detained suspect”; yet
under the Appellant’s suggested approach, “any statement obtained after
the suspect asserts his right to silence would be of questionable
admissibility”.32 She further commented that this would be so “regardless
of whether there is a causal nexus between the conduct of the police and
the making of the statement”.33 The concern was that statements would
be excluded whether or not the conduct of the police played a role in
their making.
In R. v. Grant,34 the Court has been asked to reconsider Stillman.
Grant made a self-incriminating statement to the police that led to the
discovery of a loaded revolver in his possession. He was walking down
the street and attracted the attention of police officers who approached
him and asked a few “general questions” that prompted him to divulge
that he was in possession of some marijuana and a gun. The Ontario
Court of Appeal found that Grant was arbitrarily detained — but did not
exclude the evidence, even though its admission would have some
impact on trial fairness. Justice Laskin commented on the relevance of
the police’s conduct to the section 24(2) analysis:
The nature of the police’s conduct that yielded the conscriptive
evidence is relevant because it is directed to the extent of the state’s
32

Singh, supra, note 1, at para. 44.
Id.
34
[2006] O.J. No. 2179 (Ont. C.A.); appeal to S.C.C. heard April 24, 2008, judgment
reserved [hereinafter “Grant”].
33
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interference with the accused’s autonomy and with the accused’s
freedom of choice whether to participate in the creation of selfincriminatory evidence. The more invasive the interference, the more
serious the impact on trial fairness; the less invasive the interference,
the less serious the impact on trial fairness.35

The Crown/respondent in Grant has asked the Court to depart from
the ritualistic rule of exclusion that emerged in Stillman and to restore
the trial fairness branch of the section 24(2) analysis to a more equal
footing. There is a wide spectrum of police conduct having varying
degrees of influence on the detained suspect’s decision to speak. A more
flexible section 24(2) analysis would not require the exclusion of highly
probative evidence in every case. There would be scope to consider the
relative seriousness of the breach weighed up against the adverse effect
on the administration of justice that would flow from the exclusion of
reliable evidence that is essential to the prosecution of a serious criminal
charge. If the Crown is successful in Grant, we may see a gradual
willingness by the Court to construe the section 7 Charter right to silence
more broadly and a softening of the stance taken in Singh. A new
approach to section 24(2) would permit important recognition of the
content of the section 7 right without the resulting disproportionate cost
to the overall administration of justice that the current, “Stillman model”
leads to.
2. Greater Scrutiny of the Quality of Choice Exercised by the
Individual
Now that the voluntariness test sets the constitutional standard for
the section 7 right to remain silent, the focus of the inquiry necessarily
shifts from the conduct of the police to its impact on the particular
detainee.
The central issue in determining the voluntariness of a statement
under the confessions rule (and now, under section 7) is whether the
suspect’s choice to speak was freely made or whether it was so
encumbered, influenced or interfered with by the conduct of the police
that it cannot be seen as valid. The classic “Ibrahim rule”, explained and
reaffirmed in Oickle, is concerned with police conduct that overbears the
will of the detainee, meaning that the statement would not have been

35

Id., at para. 55.
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made but for the improper inducement. As explained by Fish J., in
Spencer:
In such cases, the will of the detainee has not been “overborne” in
the sense that he or she “has lost any meaningful, independent ability
to choose to remain silent” … rather, the will of the detainee is said to
have been “overborne” only in the sense that he or she would not
otherwise have given a statement but was persuaded to do so in order
to achieve an expected result — to avoid threatened pain or achieve
promised gain. A statement thus given is the result of a calculated
decision by an operating mind; it is nonetheless considered
“involuntary” for the reasons set out in both [Ibrahim v. The King,
[1914] A.C. 599] and [R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)].36

In Singh, the Court recognized that persistent police questioning could
also amount to an improper inducement that overbears the will of the
detainee, so as to render his or her statement involuntary.37
The test for whether the conduct of the police effectively deprived
the suspect of the right to choose to remain silent is an objective one;38
however, the individual circumstances of the detainee are relevant to the
assessment. The “need to be sensitive to the particularities of the individual
suspect” was emphasized by Iacobucci J. in Oickle with the following
examples:
False confessions are particularly likely when the police
interrogate particular types of suspects, including suspects who are
especially vulnerable as a result of their background, special
characteristics, or situation, suspects who have compliant personalities
and, in rare instances, suspects whose personalities make them prone to
accept and believe police suggestions made during the course of the
interrogation.
.....
The strength of mind and will of the accused, the influence of
custody or its surroundings, the effect of questions or of conversation,
all call for delicacy in appreciation of the part they have played behind
the admission, and to enable a Court to decide whether what was said

36
37
38

Spencer, supra, note 17, at para. 32.
Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, at para. 47 (S.C.C.).
Id.
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was freely and voluntarily said, that is, was free from the influence of
hope or fear aroused by them. 39

There was regard for “the particular individual and his or her
circumstances” in appraising the strength of the inducement in Spencer
where the Court was mindful of the trial judge’s observations that
Spencer was “aggressive” and “a mature and savvy participant”.40 And in
Singh, the Court endorsed as “particularly instructive”, Proulx J.A.’s
judgment in R. v. Otis,41 excluding the confession of an emotionally
vulnerable suspect who was subjected to persistent police questioning.42
With less room to manoeuvre on the question of how far the police
can go, we can expect to see more attention being paid to the personal
circumstances and characteristics of individual accused and the contextual
dynamics of police interrogation. The objective oppressiveness of police
conduct will be magnified through the prism of a frail and weak
personality. The vulnerability that inherently exists in circumstances of
police custody and the power imbalance that underlies the dynamic
between the detainee and the police can weigh in as important elements
toward determining whether there has been an overbearing of the will so
as to legally invalidate the choice to speak.
A helpful analogy can be drawn to the examination of the quality of
apparent consent to sexual activity in circumstances where the accused
holds a position of trust, power or authority in relation to the complainant.43
In R. v. Saint-Laurent,44 Fish J.A. (as he then was) considered the
application of section 265(3)(d) of the Criminal Code. The accused was
a psychotherapist charged with sexually assaulting two patients. The
Crown argued that he exercised authority over both complainants in a
way that deliberately induced their submission to sexual relations with
him. Justice Fish cited the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
39

Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 42 (S.C.C.), quoting from W.S.
White, “False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions”
(1997) 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, at 120 and Rand J. in R. v. Fitton, [1956] S.C.J. No. 70,
[1956] S.C.R. 958, at 962 (S.C.C.).
40
Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paras.13-15, 21 (S.C.C.).
41
[2000] Q.J. No. 4320, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 416 (Que. C.A.).
42
Singh, supra, note 37, at paras. 50, 53.
43
Section 265(3)(d) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (which applies to sexual
assault) provides that “no consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist by
reason of … the exercise of authority”; and s. 273.1(2)(c) provides that no consent to sexual activity
is obtained where “the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a
position of trust, power or authority”.
44
[1993] Q.J. No. 2257, 90 C.C.C. (3d) 291 (Que. C.A.).
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Norberg v. Wynrib45 which recognized that “a position of relative
weakness can, in some circumstances, interfere with the freedom of a
person’s will”46 and that “in certain circumstances, consent will be
considered legally ineffective if it can be shown that there was such a
disparity in the relative positions of the parties that the weaker party was
not in a position to choose freely”.47 Justice Fish stressed that the trier of
fact “must remain ever mindful of the vulnerability of the victim”48 in
such circumstances because the quality of the victim’s apparent consent
could be significantly compromised by them:
As a matter both of language and of law, consent implies a reasonably
informed choice, freely exercised. No such choice has been exercised
where a person engages in sexual activity as a result of fraud, force,
fear, or violence.
.....
“Consent” is, thus, stripped of its defining characteristics when it is
applied to the submission, non-resistance, non-objection or even the
apparent agreement, of a deceived, unconscious or compelled will. 49

These views were endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v.
Matheson,50 which also involved a psychologist who exercised his
control and authority over two patients to induce them to submit to
sexual relations.
More recently in R. v. S. (D.)51 the Ontario Court of Appeal found
that the complainant’s consent was induced through the abuse of a
position of power by the accused. The accused persuaded the
complainant, his former girlfriend, to consent to sexual relations with
him by threatening to disseminate nude photographs of her if she
refused. Interestingly, the Court also held that there was no need to
resort to section 273.1 of the Criminal Code because, in the
circumstances, there was no voluntary agreement by the complainant to
engage in sexual activity. The Court reasoned that the accused’s conduct
exerted such extreme pressure on the complainant that she was unable to
freely choose whether or not to engage in the sexual activity. Her
45
46
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[1992] S.C.J. No. 60, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 27.
Id., at para. 34.
Saint-Laurent, supra, note 44, at para. 96.
Id., at paras. 98-99.
[1999] O.J. No. 1320, 134 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.).
[2004] O.J. No. 3440 (Ont. C.A.).
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apparent choice to sexually submit to him was so qualitatively
compromised by the potency of his threat that it was rendered legally
invalid — even though she could have refused and faced the threatened
consequences. The Court of Appeal’s judgment was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada.52
Borrowing from the principles in these cases, there is scope to
develop a more context-sensitive appraisal of the legal effectiveness of a
detainee’s “choice” to speak.
3. Invigoration of the Section 10(b) Right to Counsel
In the aftermath of Singh, arguments for the exclusion of selfincriminating statements might meet with greater success if framed
under the broader auspices of section 10(b) of the Charter.
Unlike the section 7 right to silence, the section 10(b) guarantee has
been more generously interpreted by the Court. In Singh, Charron J.
distinguished between the two rights, stating:
Under the Charter, the right to counsel, including an informational and
implementational component, is provided for expressly. No such
provision appears in respect of the right to silence. 53

She adopted this explanation of the reason for the difference:
Although the right to counsel and right to silence are equally
important rights, it does not follow that they will be protected in the
same way … The right to silence, by its very nature, is exercised
differently than the right to counsel and in this respect, the right to
silence and right to counsel are not the same. The exercise of the right
to silence is within the control of an accused who has an operating
mind and is fully informed of his or her rights, provided the conduct of
the authorities do not take away his or her ability to choose. In contrast,
the exercise of the right to counsel is not within the control of an
accused in detention. Rather, it is dependant upon the police
facilitating the exercise of that right. 54

Central to the expansive approach taken to the right to counsel is
recognition of its crucial role in ensuring that the accused understands
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R. v. S. (D.G.), [2005] S.C.J. No. 36, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 914 (S.C.C.).
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his or her rights; most importantly, the accused’s right to remain silent.
This was discussed by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Hebert:
The most important function of legal advice upon detention is to ensure
that the accused understands his rights, chief among which is his right
to silence. The detained suspect, potentially at a disadvantage in
relation to the informed and sophisticated powers at the disposal of the
state, is entitled to rectify the disadvantage by speaking to legal
counsel at the outset, so that he is aware of his right not to speak to the
police and obtains appropriate advice with respect to the choice he
faces. Read together, ss. 7 and 10(b) confirm the right to silence in s. 7
and shed light on its nature.55

The section 10(b) right has been cast as the watchdog of the right to
silence. It is the detainee’s chief procedural protection at the
investigative stage, when in police custody and most vulnerable to the
risk of self-incrimination.
The police must refrain from attempting to elicit evidence from a
detainee until that detainee has had a reasonable opportunity to confer
with counsel.56 Once a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct
counsel has been provided, the police may question the accused.
However, when there is a change in the jeopardy faced by the accused or
a fundamental change in the purpose of the investigation, police must
suspend questioning and, again, provide a reasonable opportunity to
exercise the section 10(b) right.57
Consider the detainee who consults with counsel and then asks to do
so again after police questioning is underway because he or she is
thinking about providing a statement but would like to consult with his
or her lawyer first. It may be that police have provided information or
presented evidence that the detainee would like to share with the lawyer.
Even though the extent of the detainee’s jeopardy and the purpose of the
investigation have not changed, the risk of self-incrimination can easily
increase as the interview progresses. Since the right to counsel is integral
to protecting the right to silence, the refusal of renewed contact with
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counsel in such circumstances could, arguably, result in a breach of the
section 10(b) right.58
Police conduct which undermines the solicitor/client relationship
also runs afoul of the section 10(b) right. During an interrogation, police
are, of necessity, trying to overcome the advice given by counsel. They
cannot, however, belittle the accused’s lawyer so as to undermine his or
her confidence in the relationship. In R. v. Burlingham,59 the police
actively disparaged the accused’s lawyer; but there is scope to argue that
less blatant conduct can produce the same effect.
Persistent questioning in the face of an assertion of the wish to
remain silent signals to the detainee that he or she should disregard the
lawyer’s advice to remain silent. At a minimum, the message is implicit.
Often, it is more direct. For instance, police may suggest that because
they are present and the lawyer is not, they are in a better position to
fully understand the detainee’s predicament and to provide guidance that
serves his or her interests.
The dissenting judgment in Singh was sensitive to implications to
the appellant’s section 10(b) right arising from the interrogation tactics
of the police. Justice Fish wrote:
… the interrogator urged Mr. Singh, subtly but unmistakeably, to
forsake his counsel’s advice.
.....
To the officer’s knowledge, Mr. Singh had been advised by his
lawyer to exercise his right to silence. The officer, with irony, if not
cynicism, discounted this “absolutely great advice” (his words) as
something he too would say if he were Mr. Singh’s lawyer. And he
then pressed Mr. Singh to instead answer his questions — “to confess
no matter what”.
Mr. Singh was thus deprived not only of his right to silence, but
also, collaterally, of the intended benefit of his right to counsel. These
rights are close companions, like glove and hand.60

This aspect of the interrogation was found to be “particularly disturbing”.
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